



Remuneration report

Extract from
pages 72 – 90 of
the Wolters Kluwer
2025 Annual Report

Remuneration report



Heleen Kersten

Co-Chair of the Selection and Remuneration Committee, dealing with remuneration matters



The Committee appreciates the strong support shareholders have shown for our performance-linked remuneration framework.

This Remuneration report outlines our philosophy and framework for management pay, provides a summary of our remuneration policy and how it was applied in 2025, and sets out how performance drove the remuneration outcome.

Letter from the Co-Chair of the Selection and Remuneration Committee

Dear Shareholders,

On behalf of the Supervisory Board, I have the pleasure of presenting our 2025 Remuneration report, which sets out how the performance in 2025 and over the last three years translated into management remuneration earned in 2025.

2025 performance and STIP outcome

As set out in this report, the overall financial and non-financial performance for the year 2025 was, in aggregate, ahead of target, resulting in an above-target payout for the short-term incentive plan (STIP). The formulaic outcome of STIP payouts are detailed in the table on page 82.

Performance against the financial targets for 2025 were as follows: The company achieved 6% organic growth and absolute revenues of €6,125 million, which was close to the 2025 STIP target. Adjusted net profit increased 6% in constant currencies, to reach €1,225 million, which was 2% ahead of the target. Adjusted free cash flow for the year was €1,348 million, up 10% in constant currencies, exceeding the target by 10%.

Performance against the three non-financial targets for 2025, together carrying a weight of 10% of STIP, were as follows: The employee belonging score was stable at 75, falling just short of the target which was to increase the score by 1 point to 76. The cybersecurity maturity score, which aims to ensure the group maintains security at or above the benchmark for high-tech companies, and is disclosed as an index, was 115.0, exceeding the target of 109.4. Finally, the office footprint, a measure aimed at reducing our scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions, was reduced by 8.1%, exceeding the target which was to reach a reduction of between 5% and 6%.

Remuneration report continued**2023-2025 performance and LTIP outcome**

The long-term incentive plan (LTIP) 2023-2025, which will be paid out in February 2026, was governed by the remuneration policy adopted by shareholders in 2021. The outcome was linked to three-year performance on relative total shareholder return (TSR), diluted adjusted EPS growth (EPS), and return on invested capital (ROIC). Performance across these three measures resulted in below-target payouts.

Total shareholder return includes dividends reinvested and uses a 60-day average share price at the start and at the end of the three-year period. Wolters Kluwer ranked in fifteenth place among TSR peers, resulting in zero payout. The TSR peers are all comparable, publicly-listed North American and European information and software companies.

The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for diluted adjusted EPS over the three-year performance period was 10.5% in constant currencies, close to target of 10.8% calculated based on constant currencies for 2025.

Final year return on invested capital (ROIC) was 18.2% in constant currencies in 2025 (18.0% in reporting currencies), which was below the target of 19.0% in constant currencies. EPS and ROIC performances translated into payouts of 98% and 77%, respectively.

Looking ahead: STIP 2026

The Supervisory Board regularly monitors the effectiveness of both financial and non-financial metrics that are used in the short-term incentive plans. The Supervisory Board is of the opinion that current financial measures used in the STIP have been very effective in driving performance and has determined these measures will be applied again in 2025 with a 90% weighting. The Supervisory Board has also decided to continue with the same non-financial measures in 2025 at a 10% weighting. Not only are these measures quantifiable and independently verifiable, the targets are also in alignment with important strategic and sustainability goals and require constant effort and investment every year to achieve.

Looking ahead: LTIP 2026-2028

The LTIP for 2026-2028 will be based on the policy adopted by shareholders in 2025 and will have the following weightings: diluted adjusted EPS at 50%, relative TSR at 30%, and ROIC at 20%.

The Supervisory Board continues to monitor the TSR peer group given the periodic delistings and mergers that take place in our sector. In 2025, no changes were necessary to the TSR peer group.

The Supervisory Board has reviewed the updated strategy and three-year financial plan for 2026-2028, and has applied additional stretch to set targets for compound annual growth in diluted adjusted EPS and for the final year ROIC. These prospective three-year targets are disclosed on page 87.

We trust that this 2025 Remuneration report provides a clear and transparent explanation of the drivers of 2025 remuneration and future goals and that shareholders can support the report at our Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on May 21, 2026.

The 2024 Remuneration report received strong shareholder support with over 92% of votes in favor. The Executive Board Remuneration Policy that was put forward in 2025 was adopted with more than 95% support. The Committee appreciates the strong support shareholders have shown for our performance-linked remuneration framework.

Heleen Kersten

Co-Chair of the Selection and Remuneration Committee, dealing with remuneration matters

Remuneration report continued

Remuneration at a glance


Summary performance against 2025 STIP targets

Measure	Actual performance		
	Target	Actual	% of target
Financial – in millions of euros			
Revenues	6,160	6,125	99%
Adjusted net profit	1,204	1,225	102%
Adjusted free cash flow	1,225	1,348	110%
Non-financial			
Employee belonging score	76	75	90%
Indexed cybersecurity maturity score	109.4	115.0	110%
Reduction in office footprint	5–6%	8.1%	110%

Financial STIP targets and actual performances are shown in reporting currencies. For details on STIP target outcomes, see page 82.

Diluted adjusted EPS (€)


CAGR 2023-2025: 10.5% in constant currencies



Target CAGR 2023-2025 was 10.8% in 2025 constant currencies. Charts are in reporting currencies.


ROIC (%)

ROIC 2025: 18.2% in constant currencies



Target for ROIC 2025 was 19.0% in 2025 constant currencies. Charts are in reporting currencies.

Three-year 2023-2025 total shareholder return



The company uses a 60-day average of the share price at the beginning and the end of each three-year performance period to reduce the influence of potential stock market volatility.

Wolters Kluwer ranked in fifteenth position for TSR performance relative to its TSR peers.

This ranking determines the number of TSR-related shares awarded at the end of the three-year LTIP period.

CEO target and realized pay 2025


Impact of performance and share price on remuneration

Target pay reflects the number of LTIP shares conditionally awarded for LTIP 2023-2025 valued at the closing share price on December 31, 2022 (€97.76).

Realized actual pay reflects the number of LTIP shares earned valued at the closing share price on December 31, 2025 (€88.34).

The final payout will be valued at the volume-weighted-average share price on the release date of the shares on February 26, 2026.

in thousands of euros, unless otherwise stated



Remuneration report continued

Our remuneration policy

Below is a summary of the Executive Board remuneration policy, including amendments adopted by the 2025 AGM in relation to LTIP weightings as of the 2026-2028 plan.

→ The remuneration policy (adopted in the 2025 AGM) is available at www.wolterskluwer.com/en/investors/governance/policies-and-articles

Key elements of our remuneration policy

Element	Policy	Change adopted in 2025
Remuneration peer group	The policy provides for a remuneration peer group that is weighted towards European companies at approximately 60%. Current pay peers are shown on page 78.	
STIP performance measures – financial	<p>The policy provides a pre-defined list of financial measures from which the Selection & Remuneration Committee can select. The STIP financial measures have a minimum weighting of 80%. These measures exclude the effect of currency, accounting changes, and changes in scope (acquisitions and divestitures) after the annual budget is finalized. The pre-defined list comprises (*used in past few years and to be used in 2026):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revenues* • Organic growth • Adjusted operating profit • Adjusted operating profit margin • Adjusted net profit* • Adjusted free cash flow* • Cash conversion ratio 	
STIP performance measures – non-financial	<p>Non-financial measures can include ESG, strategic, or operational metrics, such as employee engagement or customer satisfaction scores, measures of good corporate governance, operational excellence, or environmental impact. The STIP non-financial measures have a maximum weighting of 20%. In 2025, the weighting was 10% and included the following three strategically important metrics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Belonging score (a measure indicating whether employees believe they can be their authentic selves at work) • Cybersecurity maturity score (disclosed as an index) • Office footprint in square meters (a measure linked to scope 1 and 2 emissions) <p>In 2026, we will use the same three metrics and the weighting will again be 10%.</p>	
LTIP performance measures	<p>LTIP 2025-2027 and prior plans:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relative total shareholder return (TSR), weighted at 50% • Diluted adjusted EPS (EPS), weighted at 30% • Return on invested capital (ROIC), weighted at 20% 	<p>LTIP 2026-2028 and future plans:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relative TSR weighted at 30% • EPS weighted at 50% • ROIC weighted at 20%
Share ownership and holding requirements	The policy has minimum share ownership requirements: 3x base salary for CEO, 2x base salary for CFO, with a five-year grow-in period for new Executive Board members, and a two-year holding period post-vesting.	

Remuneration report continued

Our remuneration philosophy

Clear alignment between executive rewards and stakeholder interests is central to our Executive Board remuneration policy. We have a robust pay-for-performance philosophy with strong links between rewards and results for both our short-term incentive plan (STIP) and long-term incentive plan (LTIP). Variable remuneration outcomes are aligned to stretch targets that measure performance against Wolters Kluwer's strategic aims. The Supervisory Board has a clearly defined process for setting stretch targets and a framework for decision-making around executive remuneration.

The Selection and Remuneration Committee engages an external remuneration advisor to provide recommendations and information on market practices for remuneration structure and levels. The Committee had extensive discussions, supported by its external advisor, to review the composition and key drivers of remuneration.

We disclose targets, achievements, and resulting pay outcomes for both the STIP and LTIP retrospectively in this report. In addition, we disclose prospective LTIP targets.

The Supervisory Board determines Executive Board remuneration based on principles that demonstrate clear alignment with shareholder and other stakeholder interests. We recognize it is our responsibility to ensure that Executive Board remuneration is closely connected with financial and strategic performance.

Principles of Executive Board remuneration

Pay for performance and strategic progress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pay is linked to the achievement of key financial and non-financial targets related to our strategy • The majority of on-target pay is variable and linked to performance against stretch targets • Short-term incentives are linked to annual financial and non-financial targets • Long-term incentives are linked to performance against three-year targets aligned to our strategic plan
Align with long-term stakeholder interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy incentivizes management to create long-term value for shareholders and other stakeholders through achievement of strategic aims and delivery against financial and non-financial objectives • Majority of incentive is long-term and paid in Wolters Kluwer shares
Be competitive in a global market for talent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On-target pay is aligned with the median of a defined global pay peer group, comprised of competitors and other companies selected based on comparable size, complexity, industry or business profile, and geographic scope

Our Executive Board remuneration framework

Our Executive Board remuneration framework comprises the following elements:

Element of remuneration	Key feature	Alignment to strategy and shareholder interests
Base salary	Reviewed annually with reference to pay peer group and increases provided to employees	Set at a level to attract, motivate, and retain the best talent
Short-term incentive plan (STIP)	Paid annually in cash; maximum opportunity as % of base salary: 175% for CEO and 150% for CFO	Provides incentives to deliver performance against annual financial and non-financial goals
Long-term incentive plan (LTIP)	Conditional rights to ordinary shares, subject to a three-year vesting schedule and three-year performance targets	Provides incentives to deliver financial performance and creation of long-term sustainable value in line with our strategy; demonstrates long-term alignment with shareholder interests
Retirement benefits	Defined contribution retirement savings plan that is available to all employees in the country of employment	Provides appropriate retirement savings designed to be competitive in the relevant market
Other benefits	Eligibility for health insurance, life insurance, a car, and participation in any all-employee plans that may be offered in the country of employment	Designed to be competitive in the relevant market

Remuneration report continued

Pay is linked to strategic goals

The largest component of Executive Board remuneration consists of variable performance-based incentives, linked to achieving targets that are part of our long-term strategy and underlying financial plans. This strengthens the alignment between remuneration and company performance and reflects the philosophy that Executive Board remuneration should be linked to a strategy for long-term sustainable value creation and be aligned with our purpose and values.

Our long-term strategy is to pursue sustainable, profitable growth by providing *expert solutions* and services that deliver increased productivity and improved outcomes for professionals by leveraging advanced AI and other technologies along with our trusted proprietary content and deep domain expertise. We value our talent and aim to promote an innovative, inclusive, and customer-focused culture.

The company's mid-term strategic priorities, as they may evolve over time, are disclosed in our annual reports and are important as a foundation to set appropriate financial and non-financial targets for Executive Board remuneration.

The financial measures are Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to measure the successful execution of the company's strategy aimed at long-term value creation. Non-financial measures can include ESG, operational, or strategic measures, such as revenues from *expert solutions*, employee engagement score, customer satisfaction scores, measures of good corporate governance, operational excellence, and measures linked to environmental impact. Non-financial measures will largely be measurable and will be reported on in the annual remuneration report. Through the combination of these financial and non-financial measures, the STIP will contribute to the long-term interests and sustainability of the company. Performance measures and weighting may differ year on year reflecting the priorities of the business, but in any given year, a minimum of 80% of the measures will be based on financial criteria.

Aligning with our risk profile

The Supervisory Board assesses whether variable remuneration might expose the company to risk, taking into consideration our overall risk profile and risk appetite, as described in *Risk management*. We believe that our remuneration policy provides management with good incentives to create long-term value, without increasing our overall risk profile.

Remuneration targets linked to strategic goals

Strategic, financial, and sustainability goals	Potential short-term incentive STIP measures	Long-term incentive LTIP measures
Create long-term sustainable value		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relative total shareholder return (TSR) • Return on invested capital (ROIC): 3-year final year target • Growth in diluted adjusted EPS: 3-year CAGR target
Deliver profitable revenue growth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revenues <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organic growth • Adjusted operating profit • Adjusted operating profit margin • Adjusted net profit • Adjusted free cash flow <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash conversion ratio 	
Deliver customer success	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Customer satisfaction scores • Net Promoter Scores • Investment in product development 	
Foster a great place to work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employee engagement score • Employee belonging score • Employee turnover • Other employee metrics 	
Ensure secure systems and processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Completion rate for compliance training • Cybersecurity maturity score 	
Reduce environmental impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Office footprint measured in square meters <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scope 1 & 2 emissions intensity • Number of on-premise servers • % of revenue from digital products 	

● STIP measures selected for 2025 and 2026. LTIP measures are established in the remuneration policy.

→ For related information on our non-financial performance measures, see *Integration of sustainability-related performance in incentive schemes (GOV-3)* in the *Sustainability statements*

Remuneration report continued

Benchmarking against our peers

Pay peer group

We use a pay peer group to benchmark Executive Board pay. This includes direct competitors and other companies selected based on comparable size, complexity, industry or business profile, and geographic scope. It is made up of companies based in Europe and North America to reflect where Executive Board members most likely would be recruited to or from. The pay peer group includes nine North American and fourteen European companies, making it approximately 60% European. The most comparable businesses in Europe are companies in the Application Software and IT Consulting & Services sectors. In benchmarking pay against the pay peer group, the value of share-based remuneration is standardized to ensure a like-for-like comparison.

In 2025, the pay peer group consisted of the companies shown in the table on the right. Companies included in the TSR peer group are marked 'TSR'.













TSR peer group

The TSR peer group consists of 15 companies that are used as the comparator group to determine relative TSR performance, which is one of the measures used in the LTIP. The TSR peer group is comprised of digital information, software, and services businesses.

In case of the delisting or merger of a TSR peer group company, the Supervisory Board will carefully consider an appropriate replacement that meets strict pre-determined criteria. These criteria include industry, geographic focus, size, financial health, share price correlation and volatility, and historical TSR performance.

The TSR peer group is a sub-set of the pay peer group, with the exception of Wiley and CGI which are not in the pay peer group.

Pay and TSR peer groups

North American comparators	European comparators
CGI ¹ 	Atos
Equifax 	Bureau Veritas 
Gartner	Capgemini
Gen Digital	Clarivate
Intuit	Dassault Systèmes
MSCI	Experian 
News Corporation 	Informa 
S&P Global 	Intertek Group 
Thomson Reuters 	Pearson 
Verisk Analytics 	RELX 
Wiley ¹ 	SGS 
	Teleperformance
	Temenos
	The Sage Group 

¹ CGI and Wiley (John Wiley & Sons) are included in the TSR peer group but not in the pay peer group.

 Companies that are included in the TSR peer group.

Remuneration report continued

Target-setting process

The process for setting EPS and ROIC targets for the LTIP starts with our group strategy, which is generally refreshed every three years, and the three-year financial plan which underpins this strategy, which is updated annually. The Vision & Strategy Plan (VSP) generates a three-year forecast based on organic development of the existing business. This plan is reviewed and approved by the Supervisory Board.

For LTIP remuneration targets, this forecast is augmented with anticipated, value-creating management initiatives not accounted for in the financial plan to give realistic but stretched targets that the Supervisory Board feels will maximize the full potential of the organization. Assumptions for management initiatives are made based on historical patterns and forward-looking strategic plans. Typical management initiatives are acquisitions, divestitures, restructuring, and share buybacks (including shares repurchased under our Anti-Dilution Policy). All targets, apart from relative TSR, are based on constant currency rates and consistently applied accounting standards and policies.

The Supervisory Board compares the stretch targets against external benchmarks, where available, to ensure they represent a challenging performance in our sector and against other peers. The stretch targets are also tested for sensitivity to various input factors.

Use of discretion in determining variable remuneration

Under Dutch law, the Supervisory Board has the discretionary authority to amend Executive Board payouts, as determined by actual performance against pre-set targets, if the pay in the view of the Supervisory Board would be unacceptable based on reasonability and fairness criteria.

The Supervisory Board annually assesses the impact of certain management actions, or external events or circumstances, on results during the performance period, and may use its discretion to adjust for these actions or events. Such actions, events, or circumstances include, but are not limited to, the impact of restructuring, acquisitions, divestments, and share buybacks beyond that anticipated in the target-setting process. External events considered could include economic recession, changes in tax rates, and other events unforeseen in the target-setting process.


Variable remuneration can be clawed back after payout if the payout was based on incorrect information about the achievement of the targets or the circumstances of which payment was made dependent.

Setting targets for long-term incentive plan measures

The Supervisory Board uses a rigorous process to set stretch targets for the Executive Board.

Process for setting targets for long-term incentive plan measures

The financial plan that is part of our three-year Vision & Strategy Plan is the starting point for target setting. This plan is augmented with assumptions around management actions to arrive at realistic stretch targets.



Remuneration report continued

Implementation of remuneration policy in 2025

This section outlines the implementation of the remuneration policy for Executive Board members in 2025, in line with the remuneration policy and the remuneration framework discussed above. It also describes how the performance measures were applied in 2025.

For the performance period ending December 31, 2025, remuneration was in accordance with the remuneration policy. There were no deviations from the remuneration policy, nor from the governance process in the execution of the policy.

The Supervisory Board carried out a performance-driven scenario analysis when determining the structure and level of Executive Board remuneration for 2025.

Remuneration of the Executive Board – IFRS-based

<i>in thousands of euros, unless otherwise stated</i>	Fixed remuneration				Variable remuneration		Sub-total	Proportion fixed/variable	Tax-related costs ⁶	Total
	Base salary	Social security ⁷	Pension contribution	Other benefits ⁴	STIP	LTIP ⁵				
2025										
N. McKinstry ¹	1,575	179	106	227	2,096	3,551	7,734	27%/73%	789	8,523
S.H. Caywood ²	611	9	3	16	866	800	2,305	28%/72%	105	2,410
K.B. Entricken ³	831	60	78	215	970	1,605	3,759	31%/69%	297	4,056
Total	3,017	248	187	458	3,932	5,956	13,798		1,191	14,989
2024										
N. McKinstry ¹	1,550	200	108	245	2,053	4,339	8,495	25%/75%	191	8,686
K.B. Entricken ³	837	34	77	213	945	1,921	4,027	29%/71%	8	4,035
Total	2,387	234	185	458	2,998	6,260	12,522		199	12,721

¹ In 2025, Ms. McKinstry's base salary was \$1,671,000 (€1,574,881). The 2025 STIP payout is calculated on a U.S. dollar denominated equivalent of total salary as: \$1,671,000 x 141.77% (\$2,368,978 equivalent to €2,096,440).

² As of the appointment to the Executive Board by the Annual General Meeting on May 15, 2025, Ms. Caywood's base salary was \$1,081,000 on a full-year basis, with a STIP target of 125% of the base salary. Ms. Caywood's base salary represents the base salary incurred since the appointment by the Annual General Meeting, being \$690,268 (equivalent to €610,856). The related STIP performance is also prorated for time in plan, for the period of May 16, 2025, through December 31, 2025 (\$690,268 x 141.77% = \$978,593 (equivalent to €866,011)). In addition, Ms. Caywood's LTIP costs represent only the costs associated with LTIP grant 2025-2027, as the other LTIP grants in flight were awarded when she was CEO of the Health division.

³ The 2025 STIP payout of Mr. Entricken is calculated on a U.S. dollar-denominated equivalent of total base salary as: \$939,000 x 116.77% (\$1,096,470 equivalent to €970,328).

⁴ Executive Board members are eligible to receive benefits such as health insurance, life insurance, a car, and to participate in any plans offered to all employees at any given time, in the country of employment.

⁵ LTIP share-based payments are based on IFRS accounting standards and therefore do not reflect the actual payout or value of performance shares released upon vesting.

⁶ Tax-related costs are costs to the company pertaining to the Executive Board members ex-patriate assignments. The 2025 tax-related cost changes for Ms. McKinstry were mainly due to the timing of U.S. tax payments relating to prior years. For Mr. Entricken, the changes are a result of an increase in Dutch taxes due to more time spent in the Netherlands.

⁷ Mr. Entricken's social security costs increased as he was in the U.S. social security system for the full 2025 year.

Remuneration report continued

Summary of 2025 performance against targets

The 2025 STIP financial target for revenues was almost met, while the STIP targets for adjusted net profit and adjusted free cash flow were exceeded. Two of the three non-financial STIP targets were exceeded, whilst one fell short of target. The formulaic outcome will result in cash annual STIP payments of €2,096,440 for the CEO, €866,011 for the Designated CEO, and €970,328 for the CFO.

Three-year performance on total shareholder return, CAGR in diluted adjusted EPS, and final-year ROIC were all below target. The performance and shares to be paid out for the LTIP 2023-2025 are discussed on page 83.

Base salary 2025

The Supervisory Board approved an increase of 3.8% (2024: 3.4%) in base salary for the CEO and CFO for 2025. This was below the overall budgeted salary increase of 4.1% for Wolters Kluwer employees globally.

The 2025 base salary for the Designated CEO (Ms. Caywood), who was appointed as member of the Executive Board by the 2025 AGM, was determined by the Supervisory Board in February 2025, acknowledging her promotion.

Short-term incentive plan 2025

The STIP provides Executive Board members with a cash incentive for the achievement of specific annual targets for a set of financial and non-financial performance measures determined at the start of the year. The STIP payout as a percentage of base salary for on-target performance is shown in the table to the right, with the minimum threshold for payout and the maximum payout in the case of overperformance.

There is no payout if performance is less than 90% of the STIP target. Payout is capped at performance that is 110% or more than the STIP target.

Payout of STIP variable remuneration takes place only after assurance by the external auditor of the financial statements, including the financial KPIs on which the financial STIP targets are based.

In 2025, financial metrics were weighted at 90% and non-financial metrics were weighted at 10% of the STIP. The remuneration policy specifies a minimum of 80% weighting for financial metrics. The non-financial metrics for 2025 were held the same – belonging score, cybersecurity maturity score, and the metric of reduction in office footprint.

- For related information on our non-financial performance measures, see *Integration of sustainability-related performance in incentive schemes (GOV-3)* in the Sustainability statements
- For more information on the cybersecurity maturity score in relation to sustainability, see *Targets related to corporate culture and data privacy* in the Sustainability statements

STIP percentage payout scenarios for 2025

	Minimum payout (% of base salary)	Minimum threshold: no payout if performance is below (% of target)	Target payout (% of base salary)	Maximum payout (% of base salary)	Maximum payout if performance is above (% of target)
CEO ¹	0%	< 90%	125%	175%	≥110%
CFO	0%	< 90%	100%	150%	≥110%

¹ CEO payout percentages apply to Designated CEO, Ms. S.H. Caywood, from the date she was appointed to the Executive Board.

Remuneration report continued

The 2025 STIP performance measures and actual performance compared to targets and the resulting STIP payouts are listed in the table below. STIP performance measures are determined by the Supervisory Board and reflect the key performance indicators (KPIs) on which the company reports and that are important measures of the successful execution of our strategy.

Payouts for performance against 2025 STIP targets

in millions of euros, unless otherwise stated

Performance measures	Weighting (A)	Performance targets			Actual performance		STIP outcomes					
		Minimum	Target	Maximum	Performance	As % of target ⁴	N. McKinstry		S.H. Caywood		K.B. Entricken	
							Payout, % of base salary (B)	Weighted (A)x(B)	Payout, % of base salary (B)	Weighted (A)x(B)	Payout, % of base salary (C)	Weighted (A)x(C)
Financial												
Revenues	34.0%	5,544	6,160	6,776	6,125	99%	120%	40.8%	120%	40.8%	95%	32.3%
Adjusted net profit	28.0%	1,083	1,204	1,324	1,225	102%	135%	37.8%	135%	37.8%	110%	30.8%
Adjusted free cash flow	28.0%	1,103	1,225	1,348	1,348	110%	175%	49.0%	175%	49.0%	150%	42.0%
Non-financial												
Employee belonging score ¹	3.33%	Maintain	+1 point	+2 or more points	Maintained	90%	75%	2.5%	75%	2.5%	50%	1.7%
Indexed cybersecurity maturity score ²	3.33%	103.1	109.4	113.4+	115.0	110%	175%	5.8%	175%	5.8%	150%	5.0%
Reduction in office footprint ³	3.34%	4.0%–4.5%	5.0%–6.0%	7.0%+	8.1%	110%	175%	5.8%	175%	5.8%	150%	5.0%
Total payout as % of base salary							141.77%		141.77%		116.77%	

¹ Employee belonging score: performance targets are relative to 2024 score.

² Performance targets are set to create incentives to maintain a score at or above the benchmark for high-tech companies. The cybersecurity maturity score is disclosed as an index where 2020 = 100.0.

³ Reduction in office footprint: performance targets are based on reduction in square meters in offices used.

⁴ This percentage is capped at 110%, as performance at or above 110% or more results in maximum payout.

→ For related information on our non-financial performance measures, see *Integration of sustainability-related performance in incentive schemes (GOV-3)* in the Sustainability statements

Remuneration report continued

Long-term incentive plan 2023-2025

The LTIP provides Executive Board members conditional rights on shares (performance shares). The plan aims to align the organization and its management with the strategic goals of the company and, in doing so, reward the creation of long-term value. The total number of shares that Executive Board members receive depends on the achievement of pre-determined performance conditions at the end of a three-year performance period.

The remuneration policy which was adopted in 2021 and which applies to the LTIP 2023-2025, uses three performance measures: relative total shareholder return (TSR), CAGR in diluted adjusted EPS (EPS), and return on invested capital (ROIC).

Payout of the performance shares at the end of the three-year performance period will take place only after verification by the external auditor of the achievement of the TSR, EPS, and ROIC targets.

Total shareholder return

TSR objectively measures the company's financial performance and assesses its sustainable long-term value creation as compared to other companies in our TSR peer group. It is calculated based on the share price change over the three-year period and assumes ordinary dividends are reinvested. By using a three-year performance period, there is a clear link between remuneration and sustainable long-term value creation. The company uses a 60-day average of the share price at the beginning and end of each three-year performance period to reduce the influence of potential stock market volatility.

Wolters Kluwer's TSR performance compared to the peer group determines the number of conditionally awarded TSR-related shares vested at the end of the three-year performance period. These incentive zones are in line with best-practice recommendations for the governance of long-term incentive plans.

TSR performance ranking payout percentages

Position	Payout as % of conditional shares awarded for on-target performance
1-2	150%
3-4	125%
5-6	100%
7-8	75%
9-10	0%
11-12	0%
13-14	0%
15-16	0%

Diluted adjusted earnings per share (EPS) and return on invested capital (ROIC)

Executive Board members can earn 0%-150% of the number of conditionally awarded EPS- or ROIC-related shares, depending on Wolters Kluwer's performance compared to targets set for the three-year performance period. The Supervisory Board determines the exact targets for the EPS- and ROIC-related shares for each three-year performance period at the start of the period. The EPS and ROIC targets are based on performance in constant currencies to exclude the effect of currency movements over which the Executive Board has no control. In addition, EPS and ROIC performances are based on consistently-applied accounting standards and policies. Using EPS and ROIC as performance measures for LTIP facilitates strong alignment with the successful execution of our strategy to generate long-term shareholder value.

EPS and ROIC performance incentive table

EPS and ROIC achievement	Payout %
Less than threshold* achievement	None
Underachievement (above threshold, but below target)	50% up to 100%
On target	100%
Overachievement (above target)	Up to 150%

* Threshold will be at least 50% of target.

Performance against LTIP targets for the 2022-2024 and 2023-2025 performance periods

LTIP measure	Weighting	Target	Achievement	Payout %
Period 2023-2025				Vesting
TSR	50%	Position 5-6	Position 15	0%
Diluted adjusted EPS	30%	CAGR of 10.8%	10.5%	98%
ROIC	20%	Final year 19.0%	18.2%	77%
Period 2022-2024				Vesting
TSR	50%	Position 5-6	Position 4	125%
Diluted adjusted EPS	30%	CAGR of 9.4%	10.2%	145%
ROIC	20%	Final year 17.4%	18.1%	150%

Performance against LTIP targets in constant currencies for the two most recent LTIP performance periods are provided in the table above. Targets 2023-2025 are shown in 2025 constant currencies and targets for 2022-2024 are shown in 2024 constant currencies, and therefore may differ from targets stated in prior annual reports.

Remuneration report continued

Vested LTIP plans

LTIP vesting for the performance period 2023–2025

The performance period for LTIP 2023–2025 ended on December 31, 2025. Vested LTIP 2023–2025 shares will be released on February 26, 2026. The volume-weighted-average price for the shares released will be based on the average exchange price traded at Euronext Amsterdam on February 26, 2026, the first day following the company's publication of its annual results.

Conditional share awards vested for the period 2023–2025

<i>number of shares, unless otherwise stated</i>	Outstanding at December 31, 2025	Lower conditional number of TSR shares (-100%)	Lower conditional number of EPS shares (-2%)	Lower conditional number of ROIC shares (-23%)	Vested/ payout February 26, 2026	Estimated cash value of payout (in thousands of euros)*
N. McKinstry	46,438	(26,504)	(239)	(1,834)	17,861	1,578
K.B. Entricken	21,187	(12,092)	(109)	(837)	8,149	720
Total	67,625	(38,596)	(348)	(2,671)	26,010	2,298
Senior management**	211,942	(106,162)	(1,271)	(9,734)	94,775	8,372
Total	279,567	(144,758)	(1,619)	(12,405)	120,785	10,670

* Estimated cash value calculated as the number of shares vested multiplied by the closing share price on December 31, 2025 (€88.34).

** For Ms. Caywood, 3,895 shares vested. These are included in the senior management line because she was CEO of the Health division when those shares were conditionally awarded in 2023.

LTIP vesting for the performance period 2022–2024

The performance period for LTIP 2022–2024 ended on December 31, 2024. Vested LTIP 2022–2024 shares were released on February 27, 2025. On that day, the volume-weighted-average price of Wolters Kluwer N.V. shares was €149.75. The number of shares vested and the cash equivalent are shown below:

LTIP: shares vested for the performance period 2022–2024

<i>number of shares, unless otherwise stated</i>	Outstanding at December 31, 2024	Additional conditional number of TSR-shares (25%)	Additional conditional number of EPS-shares (45%)	Additional conditional number of ROIC shares (50%)	Vested/ payout February 27, 2025	Cash value of vested shares*
N. McKinstry	40,084	5,782	4,578	3,391	53,835	8,062
K.B. Entricken	17,201	2,481	1,965	1,455	23,102	3,459
Total	57,285	8,263	6,543	4,846	76,937	11,521
Senior management**	199,459	24,959	26,926	20,018	271,362	40,637
Total	256,744	33,222	33,469	24,864	348,299	52,158

* Cash value in thousands of euros; calculated as the number of shares vested multiplied by the volume-weighted-average price on February 27, 2025.

** Ms. Caywood was a member of senior management when LTIP 2022–2024 shares were conditionally awarded and vested.

Conditionally awarded shares

This section provides information on the outstanding conditional share awards under the pending (in-flight) LTIPs for Executive Board members and other senior management.

LTIP awards 2025–2027 and 2024–2026

The Executive Board members and other senior management have been conditionally awarded the following number of shares based on a 100% payout, subject to the conditions of the LTIP grants for 2025–2027 and 2024–2026:

Conditional LTIP share awards for performance periods 2025–2027 and 2024–2026

<i>number of shares at 100% payout</i>	Conditionally awarded TSR-based shares	Conditionally awarded ROIC- and EPS-based shares	Conditionally awarded TSR-based shares	Conditionally awarded ROIC- and EPS-based shares	Total conditionally awarded shares
	LTIP 2025–2027	LTIP 2025–2027	LTIP 2024–2026	LTIP 2024–2026	December 31, 2025
N. McKinstry	17,873	12,660	21,407	15,325	67,265
S.H. Caywood*	11,112	7,871	–	–	18,983
K.B. Entricken	8,044	5,697	9,637	6,899	30,277
Total	37,029	26,228	31,044	22,224	116,525
Senior management**	90,113	89,589	89,938	89,512	359,152
Total	127,142	115,817	120,982	111,736	475,677

* Ms. Caywood was conditionally awarded LTIP shares in 2024 before she joined as a member of the Executive Board in May 2025. These awards are therefore included in the senior management line.

** Remuneration of senior management consists of a base salary, STIP, and LTIP, and is based on the achievement of specific objective targets linked to creating value for shareholders, such as revenues and profit performance. The LTIP targets and payout schedule for senior management are similar to those for the Executive Board.

Remuneration report continued

Key assumptions for LTIP 2025-2027 and LTIP 2024-2026

Fair values for LTIP shares are provided in the table below. In the benchmarking process, the fair value of share-based remuneration is standardized to ensure a like-for-like comparison to peer companies.

	LTIP 2025-2027	LTIP 2024-2026
Fair values		
Fair value of EPS and ROIC shares at grant date (in €)	152.46	121.35
Fair value of TSR shares at grant date (in €)	107.99	86.87
TSR shares – key assumptions		
Share price at grant date (in €)	160.40	128.70
Expected volatility	20.1%	20.2%

The fair value of TSR shares is calculated at the grant date using the Monte Carlo model. For the TSR shares granted in the LTIP 2025-2027, the fair value is estimated to be €107.99 as of January 1, 2025. The inputs to the valuation were the Wolters Kluwer share price of €160.40 on the grant date (January 1, 2025) and an expected volatility of 20.1% based on historical daily prices over the three years prior to January 1, 2025. Dividends are assumed to increase annually based on historical trends and management plans. The model assumes a contractual life of three years and uses the risk-free rate on Dutch three-year government bonds.

Proposed remuneration approach for 2026

Base salary 2026

The Supervisory Board approved a regular increase in base salary for the CFO of 3.6% which is less than the overall budgeted 2026 salary increase of 3.8% for Wolters Kluwer employees globally.

The 2026 base salary for Ms. Caywood, the Designated CEO, was determined by the Supervisory Board at the time of her nomination in February 2025, and published on the company's website.

Short-term incentive plan 2026

For both the Designated CEO and CFO, the STIP percentage payout scenarios for 2026 will be the same as in 2025.

According to the remuneration policy, the Supervisory Board can annually select measures from a pre-defined list of financial measures, providing flexibility for the Supervisory Board and transparency for stakeholders.

A full list of financial measures is provided in the summary table at the front of this *Remuneration report*. The financial measures carry a weight of at least 80% under the remuneration policy. The Supervisory Board has selected the following measures from the list for 2026:

Financial performance measures for STIP 2026

Measure	Weighting	How performance is calculated
Revenues	34%	STIP financial targets are based on the annual budget which assumes development of the existing business. In calculating STIP performance results, the effect of changes in currency and accounting standards is excluded.
Adjusted net profit	28%	
Adjusted free cash flow	28%	
Total weighting of STIP financial measures	90%	

Remuneration report continued

Non-financial performance measures for STIP 2026

The non-financial measures relate to ESG, strategic, or operational priorities. The policy sets the maximum weight for these non-financial measures at 20% of the STIP. In 2026, the weight will again be set at 10% with each measure equal-weighted and separately assessed. The measures will apply to all Executive Board members.

In 2026, the following three strategically relevant, quantifiable, and verifiable non-financial STIP measures will be applied.

Non-financial performance measures for 2026

Objective	Measure	Weighting	Description of target and how it is measured
Employee culture and engagement	Belonging score	3.33%	The annual target aims to achieve an improvement in our overall belonging score. Belonging measures the extent to which employees believe they can bring their best self to work, be accepted for who they are, and perform at their best, supporting a culture of innovation. The score (on a scale of 0-100) is determined by an independent third party (2025 and 2024: Microsoft Glint).
Secure systems and processes	Indexed cybersecurity maturity score	3.33%	The annual target is based on a company-wide program designed to maintain cybersecurity at or above the industry standard benchmark for high-tech companies. The cybersecurity maturity score is assessed annually by a third party, based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) framework. The minimum payout requires the score to be maintained in line with the industry standard for high-tech companies.
Reduction in office footprint	Square meters of office footprint	3.34%	The annual target aims to achieve a reduction in our office footprint and thereby a reduction in our scope 1 and 2 emissions. The targets are based on programs managed by our global real estate team. The target and outcome are on an underlying basis excluding the impact of acquisitions and divestitures.
Total weighting of STIP non-financial measures		10.0%	

Retrospective disclosure of STIP targets

The Supervisory Board discloses STIP targets retrospectively. Due to commercial and other sensitivities, these short-term goals are not published in advance.

Long-term incentive plan 2026-2028

Conditional LTIP grants under the remuneration policy

Wolters Kluwer CEO target remuneration has historically been positioned in line with the median of the pay peer group. In the policy adopted in 2021, the maximum award of conditional shares was reduced from 285% to 240% of base salary over a two-year period, effectively reducing the CEO target remuneration by about 10%. This percentage was maintained in the remuneration policy which was adopted in by the AGM in 2025 and which applies to the conditional 2026-2028 LTIP award. As a result, the Designated CEO target remuneration is now below median of the pay peer group.

Wolters Kluwer CFO target conditional award under the 2026-2028 LTIP is 200% of base salary, which is slightly below median of the pay peer group.

Wolters Kluwer uses the fair value method for calculating the number of conditional performance shares to be awarded.

For the 2026-2028 LTIP cycle, in accordance with the policy adopted in 2025, TSR, measured against 15 peers, will have a weighting of 30% of the value of the LTIP. The weighting of EPS will be 50% of the value of the LTIP. The weighting of ROIC will continue to be 20% of the value of the LTIP.

Remuneration report continued

Prospective disclosure of LTIP targets

The table below provides our prospective LTIP targets.

LTIP measure	Weighting	Target
Period 2026-2028		
TSR	30%	Position 5-6
Diluted adjusted EPS	50%	CAGR of 9.1%
ROIC	20%	Final year ROIC of 20.6%
Period 2025-2027		
TSR	50%	Position 5-6
Diluted adjusted EPS	30%	CAGR of 8.4%
ROIC	20%	Final year ROIC of 19.5%
Period 2024-2026		
TSR	50%	Position 5-6
Diluted adjusted EPS	30%	CAGR of 10.0%
ROIC	20%	Final year ROIC of 20.7%


EPS and ROIC targets are stated in constant currencies for the first year of each three-year LTIP period.

Conditional LTIP grants 2026-2028

The number of shares conditionally awarded at the start of the performance period is computed by dividing the amount, as calculated above, by the fair value of a conditionally awarded share. The fair value of TSR-related shares can be different from the fair value of EPS- and ROIC-related shares. Pursuant to the adoption of the amended remuneration policy in the 2025 AGM, the new weighting of the measures will apply for the 2026-2028 LTIP cycle.

Performance-driven remuneration scenarios 2026

Proposed remuneration for 2026 retains a high proportion of performance-driven pay for CEO and CFO.



Remuneration report continued

Share ownership and holding requirements

According to our remuneration policy, the CEO is required to own Wolters Kluwer shares valued at three times base salary, with other Executive Board members required to hold shares valued at twice base salary. Ms. McKinstry and Mr. Entricken follow this ownership requirement with their personal shareholdings in Wolters Kluwer N.V. Pursuant to the remuneration policy, the Designated CEO has five years to comply with this requirement.

Shares owned by Executive Board members

Number of shares, unless otherwise stated	Actual ownership as multiple of base salary (as at December 31, 2025)*	Actual ownership as multiple of base salary (as at December 31, 2024)**	December 31, 2025	December 31, 2024
	N. McKinstry	26.2x	44.2x	460,412
S.H. Caywood**	1.7x	–	18,775	–
K.B. Entricken	6.0x	11.6x	56,734	60,750

* Number of Wolters Kluwer N.V. shares held at December 31 multiplied by the Wolters Kluwer N.V. share price on that date, divided by base salary.

** Ms. Caywood joined the Executive Board in May 2025; the multiple is calculated using her annualized base salary as Executive Board member. Per December 31, 2024, she held 7,054 shares.

In addition to these ownership requirements, according to the remuneration policy, performance shares (net of any income taxes due on vesting) are subject to a two-year holding period requirement, as provided in the Dutch Corporate Governance Code. This two-year holding period extends the total required retention period to five years including the three-year performance and vesting period.

If the Executive Board member is eligible for a company-sponsored deferral program and chooses to participate by deferring LTIP proceeds upon vesting, the maximum amount that can be deferred is 50% of the vested value. The remaining vested value in shares (net of taxes) is subject to the two-year holding period requirement.

CEO pay ratio

The 2025 CEO pay ratio, obtained by dividing the total 2025 remuneration for the CEO by the average of the total 2025 remuneration of all employees worldwide, decreased to 66 (2024: 77). For this purpose, the total CEO remuneration is based on the remuneration costs as stated in the table *Remuneration of the Executive Board – IFRS based*, minus tax-related costs. The average employee remuneration is obtained by dividing the total 2025 employee benefit expenses, as stated in *Note 12 – Employee benefit expenses* (after subtracting the CEO's remuneration), by the reported average number of full-time equivalent employees (minus one). As such, both the total CEO remuneration (minus tax-related costs) and the average total employee benefit expenses of all employees (minus the CEO's remuneration) are based on IFRS accounting standards. The decline in CEO total remuneration was mainly due to a lower total variable pay. In prior years, the pay ratio was reported as 77 (2024); 77 (2023); 78 (2022), 87 (2021), and 79 (2020).

Other information

The company does not grant any personal loans, guarantees, or the like to Executive Board or Supervisory Board members.

Remuneration report continued

Supervisory Board remuneration

The remuneration policy for the Supervisory Board, which was adopted at the 2024 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, aims to attract and retain high-caliber individuals with the relevant skills and experience to guide the development and execution of company strategy and facilitate sustainable long-term value creation. Supervisory Board remuneration is not tied to company performance and therefore includes fixed remuneration only. In exceptional circumstances, ad-hoc committees may be established, for which the Chair and members may receive pro-rated remuneration at the level of the Audit Committee fee, capped at five times the annual fee of the Audit Committee. Resolutions are always taken by the full Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board seeks advice from an independent external remuneration advisor.

Supervisory Board remuneration

<i>in thousands of euros</i>	Member Selection and Remuneration Committee		Member Audit Committee	2025	2024	2023
	Committee	Committee	Committee			
A.E. Ziegler, Chair	Co-Chair			174	164	169
J.P. de Kreij, Vice-Chair		Chair		127	122	127
H. Ersek	Yes			16	–	–
A. Harve	Yes			102	20	–
H.H. Kersten	Co-Chair			104	102	96
R. Lee		Yes		21	–	–
D.W. Sides		Yes		114	62	–
S. V. Vandebroek		Yes		115	115	105
C.F.H.H. Vogelzang		Yes		105	105	100
Former Supervisory Board members						
J.A. Horan	Former Co-Chair			–	40	94
B.J.F. Bodson				–	–	29
Total				878	730	720

Supervisory Board members' fees

The table below shows the fee schedule for Supervisory Board members. At the 2026 AGM, the Supervisory Board will propose an increase in the remuneration of the Supervisory Board.

The fees are in line with the Supervisory Board remuneration policy which was adopted with 98.41% of the votes at the 2024 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders.

Supervisory Board members' annual fees

<i>in euros</i>	Proposed 2026	2025	2024
Chair	175,000	130,000	130,000
Vice-Chair	125,000	95,000	95,000
Members	95,000	80,000	80,000
Chair Audit Committee	30,000	25,000	25,000
Members Audit Committee	21,000	18,000	18,000
Chair Selection and Remuneration Committee	25,000*	20,000*	20,000*
Members Selection and Remuneration Committee	17,000	14,000	14,000
Travel allowance for intercontinental travel	7,500 per meeting	5,000 per meeting	5,000 per meeting
Fixed cost reimbursement	1,500	1,500	1,500

* Due to the Co-Chair arrangement, each Co-Chair received €17,000 in 2024 and 2025 and will receive €21,000 in 2026 if the proposal is approved.

Shares owned by Supervisory Board members

At December 31, 2025, Mrs. A.E. Ziegler held 3,073 American Depositary Receipts of shares of the company (2024: 1,894 ADRs). The other members of the Supervisory Board have ordinary shares. The Supervisory Board members have acquired these shares in their private capacity and at their own risk and account, and not as part of remuneration.

Ordinary shares or ADRs owned by Supervisory Board members

<i>At December 31</i>	2025	2024
Mrs. A.E. Ziegler	3,073	1,894
Mr. D.W. Sides	1,875	–
Mr. J.P. de Kreij	3,000	–
Total shares	7,948	1,894

Shareholder voting at Annual General Meeting

The following table sets out the voting results in respect of resolutions relating to remuneration at the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders held on May 15, 2025.

Shareholder voting outcomes at the 2025 AGM

<i>Resolution</i>		% of votes for	% of votes against	votes withheld
2024 Remuneration report	Advisory	92.86%	7.14%	1,150,335
Executive Board remuneration policy		95.37%	4.63%	32,684

Remuneration report continued

Five-year overview of annual changes in remuneration (IFRS-based)

The table below provides an overview of Executive Board remuneration, Supervisory Board remuneration, company performance, and average employee remuneration for the past five years.

<i>in thousands of euros, unless otherwise stated</i>	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021
Executive Board remuneration					
N. McKinstry	8,523	8,686	8,379	7,901	9,377
Change (in %)	(1.9)	3.7	6.0	(15.7)	24.8
S.H. Caywood	2,410	–	–	–	–
Change (in %)	–	–	–	–	–
K.B. Entricken	4,056	4,035	3,340	3,741	3,404
Change (in %)	0.5	20.8	(10.7)	9.9	(17.6)
Supervisory Board remuneration*					
A.E. Ziegler (appointed 2017), Chair, Former Vice-Chair ¹	174	164	169	139	102
J.P. de Kreij (appointed 2020), Vice-Chair ²	127	122	127	120	94
H. Ersek (appointed 2025) ³	16	–	–	–	–
A. Harve (appointed 2024) ⁴	102	20	–	–	–
H.H. Kersten (appointed 2022) ⁵	104	102	96	68	–
R. Lee (appointed 2025) ⁶	21	–	–	–	–
D.W. Sides (appointed 2024)	114	62	–	–	–
S. Vandebroek (appointed 2020)	115	115	105	110	93
C.F.H.H. Vogelzang (appointed 2019)	105	105	100	100	88
J.A. Horan (appointed 2016) ⁷	–	40	94	99	91
B.J.F. Bodson (appointed 2019) ⁸	–	–	29	85	82
F.J.G.M. Cremers (appointed 2017), Former Chair ⁹	–	–	–	45	128
Company performance					
Organic growth (in %)	5.6	5.8	5.8	6.2	5.7
Adjusted operating profit margin (in %)	27.5	27.1	26.4	26.1	25.3
Year-end closing share price (€)	88.34	160.40	128.70	97.76	103.60
Share price change (in %)	(45)	25	32	(6)	50
Total shareholder return (in %)	(44)	26	34	(4)	52
Average remuneration on a full-time equivalent basis of employees					
Employee benefit expenses per FTE, excluding CEO ¹⁰	116.7	111.0	107.7	107.7	99.7
CEO pay ratio	66	77	77	78	87

* Members of the Supervisory Board are independent from the company. Their remuneration is not tied to the performance of Wolters Kluwer and therefore includes fixed remuneration only.

¹ Ms. Ziegler succeeded Mr. Cremers as Chair after the 2022 AGM.

² Mr. De Kreij succeeded Ms. Ziegler as Vice-Chair after the 2022 AGM.

³ Mr. Ersek was appointed at the EGM in 2025.

⁴ Ms. Harve was appointed at the EGM in October 2024.

⁵ Ms. Kersten was appointed at the 2022 AGM.

⁶ Ms. Lee was appointed at the EGM in 2025.

⁷ Ms. Horan retired after the 2024 AGM.

⁸ Mr. Bodson retired after the 2023 AGM.

⁹ Mr. Cremers retired after the 2022 AGM.

¹⁰ Employee benefit expenses per FTE, excluding CEO, are restated for 2022 as temporary staff and contractors are no longer reported within employee benefit expenses.